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CIVIL FORFEITURE REFORM: THE CHALLENGE
FOR CONGRESS TO PRESERVE ITS LEGITIMACY
WHILE PREVENTING ITS ABUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Twentieth Century, criminal drug trafficking has grown both in size and
complexity. The profits generated from selling illegal drugs have provided the incen-
tive for small-time dealers to expand their activities. In response to this growth, drug
operations have taken on business features, including pyramids of management and
authority. Instead of facing simple buyer-seller relationships, law enforcement has been
faced with a criminal organization which has insulated those on top and has sacrificed
those dealers on the street level. The traditional method of fighting crime directed at
punishment of criminal behavior through incarceration has proven ineffective. The
government convicts one drug defendant only to find him replaced by someone else.
Further, drug defendants have not been deterred by the threat of incarceration as the
financial benefits of dealing drugs have exceeded the criminal sanctions. Thus, even
though convictions have increased, the drug industry has continued to expand virtually
unaffected by law enforcement efforts.
In order to achieve effective law enforcement, the federal government had to re-
evaluate its methods of attacking drug crimes. It was simply not enough for the gov-
ernment to seek criminal convictions; it was necessary for the government to disgorge
the drug dealers of their moneys and properties. By removing the properties used to
facilitate drug trafficking and the profits realized from drug sales, the government
sought to eliminate the illegal drug industry. However, such an attack required disgorg-
ing drug dealers not only of currency, but also facilities and equipment used to manu-
facture and distribute the drugs and property purchased with the proceeds of unlawful
drug activity. Civil forfeiture became the primary weapon for the government to con-
fiscate all of these forms of drug assets.' Thus, the government not only achieved the
incarceration of drug dealers, but also through civil forfeiture found the means to fi-
nancially cripple the drug industry.
This note analyzes the past, present, and future of civil forfeiture in light of
legislative reform likely to occur in the next Congressional session. Part II discusses
the history of civil forfeiture and its statutory development. Part I examines current
civil forfeiture practices, including a discussion of the abuse of civil forfeiture. The
basic constitutional protections afforded property owners facing civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings is analyzed in Part IV. These protections are the result of three seminal Su-
preme Court decisions: United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, United
States v. Austin, and United States v. Ursery. Part V examines the innocent owner
defenses and problems associated with it. Part VI discusses the civil forfeiture reform
1. See JIMMY GURULE. COMPLEX CRIMINAL LITIGATION: PROSECUTING DRUG ENTERPRISES AND
ORGANIZED CRIME 223-24 (1996) (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374).
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proposals presented to the House Judiciary Committee last session: Rep. Hyde's bill
and the Department of Justice's proposal. Reform measures beyond those addressed in
these proposals are presented in Part VII. This note concludes by cautioning Congress
to tread slowly in reforming civil forfeiture as this is a complex area of law where ex-
treme action may prove disastrous to law enforcement efforts to combat crime.
II. HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
The underlying principles of civil forfeiture find their origin in the common law
of England. The English deodand provided the foundation from which American civil
forfeiture evolved. A deodand was a thing forfeited to the Crown as a result of its role
in the death of one of the King's subjects.2 It was held to be a remedial action to com-
pensate the Crown for the loss of its citizen,3 to ensure Masses for the victim's soul,
and to deter careless use of property which results in death.' The family of the victim
did not receive compensation for their injury, as the harm was considered to be to the
Crown. As English society developed, the deodand came under fierce criticism and
opposition. English citizens preferred using private lawsuits to recover for their injuries
instead of permitting the Crown to receive compensation through the use of the deo-
dand. By 1846, use of the deodand was abolished in England.' Learning from the
lessons of England, the United States prohibited the use of deodand during the first
session of Congress.7
However, the death of the deodand did not prevent its underlying principles from
finding new life. The legal fiction that a thing could be guilty and forfeited to the
government as a result appeared in the United States not in the form of a deodand, but
rather in the statutorily created civil forfeiture.8 Further, the principle that a deodand
did not constitute punishment but instead represented a remedial measure was also
incorporated into civil forfeiture. Thus, civil forfeiture resulted from an in rem pro-
ceeding,9 in which the government initiated forfeiture proceedings against the property
involved in the criminal activity."0 As a consequence, the property owner's criminal
guilt or innocence was irrelevant. The Constitutional protections afforded a defendant
prosecuted for criminal conduct were not available to the owner whose property is the
subject of the forfeiture proceedings." However, the Supreme Court has extended
2. United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993); LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO
STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 7 (1996).
3. LEVY, supra note 2, at 11.
4. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611.
5. LEVY, supra note 2, at 18.
6. Id.
7. Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.
8. Austin, 509 U.S. at 613 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
682 (1974)). The first statutorily authorized forfeitures involved violations of customs and revenue
laws. See generally L. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS (1939); Jimmy Gurule, The Ancient
Roots of Modern Civil Forfeiture, 21 J. LEGIS. 155, 157 (1995).
9. An in rem proceeding means that property, as opposed to a person, is considered the offender
and the guilt or innocence of the property is being determined. Whereas, an in personam proceeding
occurs when the person is considered the offender and that person's guilt or innocence is being deter-
mined. See Michael F. Zeldin and Roger G. Weiner, Innocent Third Parties and Their Rights in For-
feiture Proceedings, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 843, 843-44 (1991).
10. LEVY, supra note 2, at 19-20.
11. See generally id. at 22-23; Terrence G. Reed, On the Importance of Being Civil, 39 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 255, 265-68 (1994); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction,
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certain constitutional protections to property owners, even though the action is civil not
criminal in nature.
Originally, civil forfeiture was only authorized for violations of customs and
revenue laws. In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act,12 which authorized the use of civil forfeiture in the "war on drugs."
Section 551 of this Act "was limited in scope and authorized forfeiture of only the ille-
gal substances themselves, the instruments by which they were manufactured and
distributed, and conveyances used to transport, or in manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of illegal controlled substances."' 3 The
Act was amended in 1978 to permit the forfeiture of proceeds derived from illegal
drug activities." However, this amendment also provided for an innocent owner de-
fense. Under this defense, the owner whose property is guilty may prevent the forfei-
ture by proving that he or she was without knowledge and did not consent to the ille-
gal use of the property. 5 Finally in 1984, section 881 was amended when Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act ("CFA.") 6 The CFA expanded civil forfei-
ture to include all real properties used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate
the commission of a federal narcotics felony. Further, the CFA established the relation-
back doctrine in the realm of civil forfeiture. 7 Under this doctrine, "all right, title,
and interest in property ... vest in the United States upon commission of the act giv-
ing rise to forfeiture."' 8 This prevents the government from losing property subject to
forfeiture simply because the property owner transfers the property to another party
after the commission of the crime but before the government institutes civil forfeiture
proceedings.
I. CIVIL FORFEITURE IN PRACTICE
A. Civil Forfeiture Proceedings
Under current civil forfeiture laws, neither the property owner nor the person
who used the property for a criminal purpose needs to be charged or convicted of a
crime before civil forfeiture proceedings may be instituted by the government. Most
civil forfeitures are initially administrative and non-adversarial, whereby the agency is
authorized by regulations to seize and forfeit the property. Notice of the forfeiture
42 HASTINGs L.J. 1325 (1991) [hereinafter Constitutional Limits].
12. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1276 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 880-881 (1994)). Civil forfeiture
is authorized under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). While the majority of civil forfeitures occur under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a) in relation to drug offenses, forfeiture is authorized under other statutes. See Katz, James V.,
Asset Forfeiture: Compilation of Civil Statutes, Asset Forfeiture Office Criminal Division, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (Sept. 1987); LEVY, supra note 2, at 31.
13. GURULE, supra note 1, at 226.
14. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994)).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994) provides:
[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of the
owner, by reason of any act or omission established by the owner to have been commit-
ted or omitted without knowledge or consent of the owner.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 981(a) (1994) (innocent owner defense).
16. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994)).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (1994) (relation-back provision).
18. Id.
19. GURULE, supra note 1, at 224. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1615 (1994) outlining the substantive
and procedural statutes in civil forfeiture.
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proceedings must be given to the property owner setting out the proper procedures for
the owner to follow if the owner wishes to contest the forfeiture.' If the property
owner does nothing, the property is declared forfeited by the seizing agency. This
declaration has the same force and effect of a judicial order.2 However, if the proper-
ty owner wishes to challenge the forfeiture, the owner must claim an interest in the
property and file a cost bond.' Once the property owner has complied with these two
requirements, the forfeiture is no longer administrative and the forfeiture complaint is
then transferred to the prosecuting office to be pursued as a judicial forfeiture.23
In a judicial forfeiture, the court conducts a forfeiture trial in which the govern-
ment and the claimant are given an opportunity to present evidence. At the trial, the
initial burden is on the government to establish that probable cause exists to believe
the property seized is subject to forfeiture.' The burden then shifts to the property
owner to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that either the property was not
used for illegal purposes, the property is innocent, or that he or she is an innocent
owner.26 If the property owner is successful in challenging the forfeiture, then the
property is returned. However, despite the owner's success, there is no statute provid-
ing a right to damages for loss of income from the property during the period of depri-
vation, nor reimbursement for attorneys fees incurred by the owner in contesting the
forfeiture."7
If the property owner fails to prove the property is not subject to forfeiture, then
the court will enter judgment for the government, and as a result the property is for-
feited. The forfeited property then becomes part of the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund
("Fund").' While seized currency is normally deposited directly into the Fund, real
property is generally sold and the proceeds deposited into the Fund. Personal property,
such as vehicles and weapons, is either returned to the seizing agency for its own use
or sold and the proceeds deposited into the Fund. These moneys and assets are then
redistributed according to congressional appropriation. If the crime for which the prop-
20. See Muhammed v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 92 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1996), for a discussion
of the adequacy of the Notice qf Forfeiture to explain the proper procedures to follow in contesting a
forfeiture, as well as the degree to which an owner must comply with these procedures. See also 19
U.S.C. § 1607 (1994).
21. See 19 U.S.C. § 1609 (1994).
22. Muhammed, 92 F.3d at 651. United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property Located in Rus-
sell County, Alabama, 92 F.3d 1123, 1126 (11th Cir. 1996). The cost bond is generally 10% of the
value of the property, 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994).
23. See 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1994).
24. While most civil actions require a preponderance of the evidence, the federal circuits only
require the government to meet the probable cause standard, 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1994). See United
States v. $87,118.00, 95 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1996) (the government must initially establish probable
cause exists to believe the property is subject to forfeiture); United States v. One Parcel of Property
194 Quaker Farms Road, 85 F.3d 985, 987 (2d Cir. 1996) (the government must show probable cause
that the property is subject to forfeiture); Two Parcels, 92 F.3d at 1126 (same).
25. $87,118.00, 95 F.3d at 518 (citing United States v. All Assets & Equipment of West Side
Building Corp., 58 F.3d 1181, 1188 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 698 (1996)) ("Probable
cause for forfeiture exists if the government demonstrates a nexus between the seized property and the
illegal drug activity.")
26. Two Parcels, 92 F.3d at 1126.
27. See Damon G. Saltzburg, Real Property Forfeiture as a Weapon in the Government's War on
Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REv. 217, 230-34 (1992) (discuss-
ing split in the circuits on awarding pre-judgement interest, damages, and attorneys fees, even though
not statutorily required).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1994) creates and governs the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund.
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erty was forfeited involves a victim, all of the proceeds are used for victim restitution.
However, as only a small amount of the drug cases involve victims, most of the pro-
ceeds go back to law enforcement agencies in proportion to their efforts in seizing the
property. These amounts cover daily overhead costs in these agencies, as well as pro-
viding resources for future law enforcement efforts to combat crime.
B. Civil Forfeiture Abuse
As the full potential of civil forfeiture in combating the illegal drug industry be-
comes apparent, so to does its potential for abuse.29 In fact, probably the most publi-
cized aspect of civil forfeiture has been its abuse. Some extreme critics believe that
civil forfeiture amounts to an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation,
without a prior criminal conviction of the owner, and without adequate constitutional
protections.' They believe that civil forfeiture should be abolished. Meanwhile, most
critics believe that civil forfeiture abuses can be adequately redressed through reform.
In identifying these abuses, there are two primary sources: the statutory provisions and
the law enforcement agencies. First, many of the statutory provisions, especially the
innocent owner defense, are sharply criticized for being poorly drafted and failing to
adequately protect the owner's rights.3 Second, abuse results from improper govern-
mental use of civil forfeitures. This occurs when there is no probable cause to seize
the property. It also happens when the government attempts to bargain with the owner,
whereby the owner consents to the forfeiture of some of the property to avoid litiga-
tion costs and to guarantee the return of some of the property. This forfeiture is unjust
if the property is not subject to forfeiture in the first place.
While some abuses can be remedied by legislative reform of civil forfeiture, fur-
ther reform of the internal guidelines, regulations, and policies of the seizing agencies
and the government must complement any legislative reform. A certain amount of
abuse is inevitable as an incredible amount of power is given to the government
through civil forfeiture. However, the solution to the problem is not to terminate the
use of civil forfeiture which serves legitimate purposes, such as removing property
used to commit criminal activity and disgorging proceeds derived from illegal activi-
ty.32 Instead, measures must be taken to eliminate abuse through constitutional
protections, legislative reform, and internal regulations and policies. Civil forfeiture has
a vital role to play in the war on drugs; however, its role must not be manipulated in
such a manner that it creates injustice by depriving legitimate owners of their property.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AND CIVIL FORFEITURE
As civil forfeiture became the weapon of choice in the government's war on
drugs, the Supreme Court became concerned that property owners were not adequately
protected under current civil forfeiture statutes. In the absence of statutory safeguards,
the Supreme Court analyzed the Constitutional protections available to property owners
29. See Symposium: What Price for Civil Forfeiture? Constitutional Implications and Reform Ini-
tiatives, 39 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 1 (1994) (general discussion of background of civil forfeiture, its
abuse, and reform); Symposium: Federal Asset Forfeiture Reform, 21 J. LEGIS. 1 (1995) (same).
30. LEvy, supra note 2.
31. See Sandra Guerra, Family Values: The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset
Forfeiture, 81 CORNE.L L. REv. 343, 370-72 (1996) (quoting United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce,
43 F.3d 794, 815 (3rd Cir. 1994)).
32. United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2145 (1996).
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in civil forfeiture proceedings under the Due Process Clause, the Excessive Fines
Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court eventually concluded that the Due
Process and Excessive Fines Clauses applied to civil forfeiture proceedings and offered
protections to the property owner. However, the Court refused to extend the
protections found in the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeiture proceedings.
A. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person
shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ... "
While this Amendment clearly states that a person's property cannot be taken without
due process, it fails to define the procedural due process protections that must be af-
forded a property owner in civil forfeiture. As a result, many courts permitted the
seizure of real property without giving notice or providing a hearing to the owner."
These courts held that a post-seizure hearing afforded the owner adequate opportunity
to contest the forfeiture and did not violate the Due Process Clause. Thus, homes and
business offices could be seized without notice or a hearing, and the owner could be
deprived of the property until the post-seizure forfeiture hearing.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property35
In July of 1985, James Daniel Good pled guilty to promoting a harmful drug in
the second degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1245(b) (1985). His conviction
was the result of a legal search of his residence which led to the seizure of eighty-nine
pounds of marijuana, marijuana seeds, vials containing hashish oil, drug paraphernalia,
and $3,187.00. Good was sentenced to one year in jail and five years probation, fined
$1,000.00, and required to forfeit the money seized.3" In August of 1989, the United
States instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against Good's home and the four acres
upon which it was situated, claiming this property was subject to forfeiture as it was
used to facilitate the commission of a drug offense." On August 18th, in an ex parte
proceeding, the District Court found the government had established probable cause to
believe the property was subject to forfeiture based upon Good's conviction in 1985.
The judge issued a warrant of arrest in rem, authorizing the seizure of Good's property.
On August 21st, the government seized the property without prior notice to Good or an
adversary hearing. 8
Good filed a claim and cost bond contesting that the forfeiture of the property
without notice or a hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Ninth
Circuit reversed and held that the seizure of Good's real property without notice or a
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. See United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992); Richmond Tenants Org., Inc., v.
Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1306-08 (4th Cir. 1992).
35. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
36. Id. at 46.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994) provides:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture ...All real property . . .which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a violation of this subchapter ....
38. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 47.
[Vol. 23:93
Civil Forfeiture Reform
hearing violated the Due Process Clause." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide the issue of "whether, in absence of exigent circumstances, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited the [g]overnment in a civil forfeiture case
from seizing the real property without first affording the owner notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard."
The government argued that seizures of property were governed under the Fourth
Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment. The government contended that the prohibition
against unreasonable seizures, such as the seizure of property without probable cause,
was sufficient constitutional protection. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
explaining that civil forfeitures sought not only to seize the property but also to divest
the owner of title. Thus, the Fourth Amendment did not afford adequate constitutional
protection for the property owner. Furthermore, the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment protection did not preclude other constitutional provisions, such as the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, from providing additional protection. Thus, the Court
addressed the due process requirements in civil forfeiture proceedings.
Initially, the Supreme Court acknowledged its holding in Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,41 that the seizure of personal property without notice or a
hearing did not violate due process. As personal property "could be removed from the
jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of the confiscation"'42 was
given, the Court concluded that "'a special need for very prompt action' justified the
postponement of notice and hearing until after the seizure."' The Court distinguished
Calero-Toledo from Good, noting that the real property involved in Good "by its very
nature [could] be neither moved nor concealed." Thus, the "special need" inherent
in personal property is not generally present in seizures involving real property and the
property owner had to be afforded both notice and a hearing under the Due Process
Clause. However, the Court recognized the possibility that exigent circumstances might
exist requiring seizure prior to notice or a hearing.45 The Court declared that exigent
circumstances would be fact specific. Further, in determining whether exigent circum-
stances existed, the Mathews' factors should be applied: (1) the private interests af-
fected by the action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the procedures used, as well as the probative value of additional safeguards, and (3)
the government's interest, including the administrative burden that additional procedural
requirements would impose.47 Applying the Mathews factors to Good, the Court found
"Good's right to maintain control over his home, and to be free form governmental
interference [to be] a private interest of historic importance." As to the potential risk
of error, the Court concluded that the "ex parte preseizure proceeding afford[ed] little
or no protection to the innocent owner."' Further, the Court explained that the post-
39. Id. at 47-48.
40. Id.
41. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
42. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 52 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679)).
43. Id. at 52 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678).
44. Id. at 52-53.
45. Id. at 53.
46. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47. Id. at 335.
48. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 53-54.
49. Id. at 55.
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seizure hearing was not sufficient to compensate the innocent owner for losses suffered
because the hearing may not be held for several months."0 In considering the
government's interests, the Court declared that the government's interest in seizing the
real property did not require immediate or prompt action, as was the case with person-
al property. The Court recognized the government's interest in preventing the destruc-
tion or disposition of the property; however, the Court explained that this interest could
be protected by other procedures, such as pretrial restraint or lis pendens.51 After ap-
plying the Mathews factors, the Court concluded that exigent circumstances did not
exist and that notice and a hearing should have been offered to Good.52
Although the Court held that absent a showing of exigent circumstances, the Due
Process Clause requires that a property owner be given notice and a hearing prior to
the seizure of real property, the Court did not address what the appropriate remedy for
a violation of Good should be. While only a few circuits have addressed the issue, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the proper remedy for this violation is the dismissal of
the forfeiture action without prejudice. 3 Thus, the government is permitted to start all
over again, this time affording the owner notice and a hearing as required by the Due
Process Clause.
B. The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause clearly declares that no exces-
sive fines shall be imposed.' However, its application in civil actions, specifically in
civil forfeitures, is less than obvious. Couched between the clauses prohibiting exces-
sive bail and cruel and unusual punishment, the Excessive Fines Clause arguably ap-
plied only in criminal prosecutions. As civil forfeiture by definition is not criminal,
there was doubt as to whether the scope of this Clause encompassed civil forfeiture.55
If the Clause extended to civil forfeitures, owners could then argue the forfeiture of
their property was excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment. If, however, the
Clause's scope did not reach civil forfeitures, property owners must rely on other con-
stitutional provisions to safeguard their property interests.
United States v. Austin
56
Richard Lyle Austin met with Keith Engebretson, a federal undercover agent, at
Austin's autobody shop. Austin agreed to sell Engebretson two grams of cocaine. Aus-
tin ran to his home, returned to the shop, and sold Engebretson the cocaine. The fol-
lowing day, South Dakota state authorities executed a search warrant on Austin's shop
and mobile home. The authorities seized small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a
.22 caliber revolver, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $4,700.00.17 Austin plead
guilty to one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of
50. Id. at 56.
51. Id. at 57-59.
52. Id. at 62.
53. United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994). But see United
States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 1994) (the proper remedy for a viola-
tion of Good is application of the exclusionary rule not dismissal).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55. See Cheh, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 11, at 1381.
56. United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
57. Id. at 605.
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South Dakota drug laws. Subsequently, the federal government initiated in rem civil
forfeiture proceedings against Austin's autobody shop and mobile home under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) & (7). Austin filed a claim and cost bond, and contested the forfei-
ture arguing it violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the U.S. Constitution." The
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, holding that the
Eighth Amendment did, not apply to civil forfeiture. The Eighth Circuit reluctantly
affirmed the judgment, but stated "we are troubled by the Government's view that any
property, whether it be a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by
the Government because the owner, regardless of his or her past criminal record, en-
gages in a single drug transaction." 9 The court felt constrained to affirm the judg-
ment based upon precedent which established that the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Fines Clause did not apply to civil forfeitures.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). In concluding that these civil forfeitures were subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause, the Court "signaled that the civil nature of a forfeiture pro-
ceeding [would] not insulate forfeiture from the protections of [the Bill of Rights].'t
The Supreme Court advanced three reasons for its holding. First, as 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) provided an innocent owner defense, the Court concluded that
this emphasis on the guilt or innocence of the property owner indicated that forfeiture
was intended to punish those persons involved in illegal drug trafficking.6 Second,
upon examining the legislative history of forfeiture, the Court found that Congress
intended for civil forfeitures to correspond to the commission of drug offenses.62
Third, the Court opined that the language in the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 881
implied "that Congress intended forfeiture to serve as 'a powerful deterrent' or punish-
ment against those dealing in illicit drugs."63 Furthermore, the Court declared that any
civil forfeiture provision that did not serve a solely remedial purpose but also served
deterrent or retributive purposes constituted punishment for purposes of the Excessive
Fines Clause." The Court then went on to conclude "that forfeiture generally and
statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at least in
part, as punishment."'65 The Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to analyze the
forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause.
From the Court's language in the Austin opinion, it is clear that most civil forfei-
tures are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.' However, the Supreme Court re-
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
59. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (1992).
60. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something this easy, quick, and profitable also be fair? Runaway Civil
Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REv. 1, 41-47 (1994) (discussing prob-
lems surrounding direct pay-back to law enforcement of forfeited assets) [hereinafter Runaway Civil
Forfeiture].
61. Austin, 509 U.S. at 619.
62. Id. at 620.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 621 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
65. Id. at 618. Furthermore, the majority of the Supreme Court declared:
Furthermore, as we have seen, forfeiture statutes historically have been understood as
serving not simply remedial goals but also those of punishment and deterrence.
Id. at 622 n.14.
66. But see United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the forfeiture of
drug proceeds is remedial, not punitive for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
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fused to explain the proper test courts should apply in determining whether a civil
forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines prohibition. The courts have developed various
tests, but they have primarily focused on either the relationship between the property
forfeited and the drug activity giving rise to the forfeiture or the proportionality be-
tween the gravity of the drug offense and the value of the property being forfeited.
Some courts have applied a hybrid pf the relationship test and the proportionality test,
while also considering other factors. 7
Regardless of which test is ultimately applied, the effect of Austin is to limit the
government's ability to forfeit property where the value of the property is dispropor-
tionate to the harm caused by the underlying criminal offense. In light of Austin, con-
troversy erupted over whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
necessarily applied to civil forfeiture in light of the fact that it also placed constitution-
al limits on the ability of the government to "punish.""
C. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause' has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to protect individuals from three abuses. First, an individual may not
be prosecuted for the same offense after an acquittal. Second, an individual may not be
prosecuted for the same offense after a conviction. Third, an individual may not be
subject to multiple punishments for the same offense.' The last situation has far-
reaching consequences if civil forfeitures are considered punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Holding that civil forfeiture may constitute punishment would pre-
clude the government from seeking both a criminal conviction and a civil forfeiture in
separate proceedings. As many civil forfeitures are the result of an administrative
forfeiture by the seizing agency, without knowledge of the prosecuting office, rarely
would a criminal prosecution and a civil forfeiture be pursued in the same proceeding.
The Supreme Court decisions in Austin and two other recent cases led to the
controversial application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures which
resulted in the vacating of criminal convictions that followed a civil forfeiture, and the
return of property civilly forfeited after a criminal conviction. In United States v.
Halper,7' the Supreme Court held that a civil penalty constituted punishment if the
amount of the penalty was sufficiently disproportionate to the injury or harm to the
government.' In Halper, the defendant was convicted of submitting false Medicare
claims and sentenced to prison and fined $500.00. The federal government then
brought a civil suit against Halper under the False Claims Act which authorized a civil
penalty of $130,000.00. The actual amount of money Halper obtained through the false
claims was $585.00." The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
government but limited the penalty to double damages and costs totaling
67. See generally GURULE, supra note 1, at 256-64 (discussing the various excessive fines tests
applied by the circuits after Austin); See Steven Kessler, For Want of a Nail: Forfeiture and the Bill
of Rights, 39 N.Y. L. REV. 205, 213-36 (same).
68. Stefan D. Cassella, Status of Double Jeopardy and Forfeiture Law in the Sixth Circuit, 84
KY. L.J. 553 (1996).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
70. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
71. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
72. Id. at 449.
73. Id. at 437-38.
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$16,000.00." . The Supreme Court declared that a case-by-case balancing of the injury
caused to the government against the amount of the civil penalty should be used to
determine whether a civil penalty constituted punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause." However, the Supreme Court warned that "[w]hat we announce now is the
rule for the rare case... where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-
gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has
caused." 6 In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,' the Supreme
Court addressed whether a tax penalty imposed upon a defendant only after his drug
conviction constituted punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. Relying on the lan-
guage in Halper, the Court concluded that a tax penalty that was punitive in nature
would constitute punishment." As this tax penalty required a prior drug conviction
before the tax could be imposed and taxed an individual for illegal drugs no longer
possessed or owned, the Court found that it constituted punishment and violated the
prohibition against a second punishment for the same offense. 9
Applying the broad language in Austin, coupled with the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Halper and Kurth Ranch, the courts began to expand double jeopardy analysis
to civil forfeitures.' As a result, a myriad of interpretations followed trying to come
to grips with civil forfeitures and criminal prosecutions based upon the same offense.
The Supreme Court finally consolidated two cases and granted certiorari to determine
whether civil forfeitures could constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
United States v. Ursery1
In the first of the consolidated cases, United States v. Ursery,s the government
instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding against Ursery's home which he allegedly used
to facilitate illegal drug transactions. Following the judgment forfeiting the property,
the government brought criminal charges and Ursery was convicted of violating 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), manufacturing marijuana. The Sixth Circuit reversed Ursery's con-
viction claiming it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibition against multiple
punishments. The Court categorically declared all civil forfeitures constituted punish-
ment for purposes of double jeopardy.83 In the second consolidated case, United
States v. $405,089.23,' Charles Arlt and James Wren were convicted of conspiracy to
aid and abet in the manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,
conspiracy to launder money instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and numer-
ous counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Defendant Arlt was
sentenced to life in prison and fined $250,000.00. Following the criminal conviction,
the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government in the civil
74. Id. at 439.
75. Id. at 449-50.
76. Id. at 449.
77. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
78. Id. at 1945-46.
79. Id. at 1947-48.
80. See generally GURULE, supra note 1, at 264-81 (discussing how the federal circuits approach
double jeopardy claims prior to Ursery).
81. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
82. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 573.
84. United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
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forfeiture proceedings brought under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) against the money seized which totaled $405,089.23. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the forfeiture order holding that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause as
forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. § 981 and 21 U.S.C. § 881 always constitute punish-
ment. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether these particular
forfeiture provisions constituted punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. The
Court held "[tihese civil forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally) ... do not consti-
tute 'punishment' for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.""8
The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining case law considering the
relationship between the Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeitures. The Court be-
gan by examining its 1931 decision in Various Items of Personal Property v. United
States."7 In Various Items, a distilling corporation that had been convicted of criminal
violations was forced to forfeit a distillery, warehouse, and denaturing plant. The Su-
preme Court held that "[t]he forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal
offense. The provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in respect to double
jeopardy does not apply."88 Further, the Court "drew a sharp distinction between in
rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil penalties such as fines: Though the latter
could, in some circumstances, be punitive, the former could not." 9 The holding in
Various Items was reaffirmed in One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United States
90and One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 9 In 89 Firearms, the Supreme Court enunci-
ated a two-step test to determine whether a civil forfeiture constituted punishment. The
first step required an examination of the legislative history to determine whether Con-
gress intended the civil forfeiture to serve a remedial purpose or a punitive purpose.'
The second step involved an analysis of the nature and effect of the civil forfeiture to
resolve whether the forfeiture was "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate
Congress' intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism."93
The Supreme Court then addressed whether its decisions in Halper, Austin, and
Kurth Ranch altered or supplanted the 89 Firearms two-step test. In concluding that
these decisions did not, the Court distinguished between the civil fines or tax penalties
and civil forfeitures, and between punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines
Clause and punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. With regard to
Halper's holding that an arbitrary fixed-penalty provision overwhelmingly dispropor-
tionate to the harm caused to the government violated the Excessive Fines Clause, the
Court found this civil penalty easily distinguishable from a civil forfeiture in which
property directly related to criminal activity is forfeited not only to compensate the
government but also to prevent illicit use of the property and to disgorge the owner of
the unlawful fruits."4 As to the holding in Kurth Ranch that a tax penalty constituted
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court limited its holding
85. Id. at 1219.
86. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138 (1996).
87. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
88. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2140 (quoting Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581).
89. Id. at 2141 (emphasis in original).
90. One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
91. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
92. Id. at 363-65.
93. Id. at 365 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
94. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2144-45.
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to tax penalties not aimed at revenue gathering, rejecting its application to civil forfei-
tures.95 Finally, the Court distinguished its decision in Austin which held that civil
forfeitures could constitute punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause
from the cases at bar by declaring that punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause
was not the same as punishment under the Excessive Fines.96 Thus, Halper, Austin,
and Kurth Ranch did not displace or alter the 89 Firearms analysis.
Applying the 89 Firearms test to the cases at bar, the Supreme Court held that
these forfeitures were intended by Congress to be remedial, as opposed to criminal.
Further, the Court explained that nothing in their nature or effect is "so punitive ... as
to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary." The Court ac-
knowledged that the presence of the innocent owner defense appears to limit forfeiture
to situations where a relationship exists between the property and the criminal activity,
but concluded that without more indication of an intent to punish, the innocent owner
defense is not dispositive in determining whether a statute is punitive.98 The Court,
however, went beyond simply holding these forfeiture provisions to be remedial and
declared that all civil forfeitures normally will not constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes.
In rebuking the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court surmised "[i]t would have
been quite remarkable for this Court to have held unconstitutional a well-established
practice, and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having even suggested
that it was doing so." The judgments of the Courts of Appeals were reversed.
D. Summary of the Constitutional Protections
After all is said and done, procedurally, the Due Process Clause protects a real
property owner from governmental seizure without prior notice and a hearing. Substan-
tively, civil forfeitures generally constitute punishment under the Excessive Fines
Clause. However, they are not considered punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, the property owner is afforded some constitutional
protections, but not nearly the degree of protections a property owner is afforded if
prosecuted for the crime giving rise to the civil forfeiture.
V. THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE
Once the government establishes probable cause to believe the property is subject
to forfeiture, the burden then shifts to the property owner to prove either the property's
innocence or his innocence as the owner. In regard to forfeitures under the drug provi-
sions, the innocent owner defense provides that "no property shall be forfeited ... to
the extent of the interest of an owner by reason of any action or omission ... commit-
ted or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."1" Thus, a property
owner may qualify as an innocent owner if he or she lacks knowledge of the criminal
use of the property or did not consent to the criminal use of the property. Congress
95. Id. at 2146.
96. Id. at 2146-47.
97. Id. at 2148.
98. Id. at 2149.
99. Id. at 2147.'
100. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(7) (1994). See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1994) which
provides an innocent owner defense based upon a lack of knowledge with no mention of a lack of
consent.
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enacted this provision to ensure that criminals were punished while preventing innocent
owners from losing their property simply by "unwitting association with wrongdo-
ers.'' 1° At first glance, this provision appears to provide protection for owners who
are unaware of the criminal use to which the property is being put. However, in reali-
ty, the innocent owner defense is anything but simple and straight-forward."°
United States v. Buena Vista Avenue"W
In Buena Vista, the Supreme Court faced the task of defining the proper applica-
tion of the innocent owner defense. The government instituted forfeiture proceedings
against a home bought by Joseph Brenna for his girlfriend who had title to the proper-
ty. Brenna had been involved in several drug transactions and the government alleged
that the money used to purchase the home was the proceeds of these unlawful drug
transactions. Brenna's girlfriend filed a claim and contested the forfeiture arguing that
she had "no knowledge of the origin of the funds" and was an innocent owner.)
The District Court rejected her innocent owner defense declaring: (1) the defense was
only available to bona fide purchasers for value, and (2) only owners of the property at
the time of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture could invoke the defense. The Third
Circuit reversed the District Court on both grounds."a
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve: (1) whether the inno-
cent owner defense only applied to bona fide purchasers for value, and (2) whether the
relation-back doctrine takes priority over the innocent owner defense."° In deciding
that the innocent owner defense applied beyond bona fide purchasers for value, the
Court concluded that nowhere in the text of the statute did Congress attempt to restrict
the application of the defense only to bona fide purchasers for value."° Therefore,
even though Brenna's girlfriend received the home as a gift, she was eligible for pro-
tection under the innocent owner defense. Further, the Court found that the relation-
back doctrine did not trump an innocent owner who obtained an interest in the proper-
ty after the criminal use occurred."m The Court recognized that allowing the relation-
back doctrine to supersede the innocent owner defense would render the defense mean-
ingless, especially in regard to the proceeds of drug activity subsequently used to pay
for legitimate goods and services. Having concluded that the innocent owner defense
applies beyond bona fide purchasers for value and is not trumped by the relation-back
101. United States v. 6640 SW 48th Street, 41 F.3d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. 1012 Germantown Road, 963 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1992)).
102. For more in-depth discussions of the innocent owner defense and problems associated with its
application, see generally Symposium: What Price for Civil Forfeiture? Constitutional Implications and
Reform Initiatives, 39 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1994); Symposium: Federal Asset Forfeiture Reform,
21 J. LErIs. 1 (1995); GURULE, supra note 1, at 281-97; LEVY, supra note 2, at 161-76; Guerra,
supra note 31;, Saltzburg, supra note 28; Zeldin and Weiner, supra note 9; O'Brien, Note: Caught in
the Crossfire: Protecting the Innocent Owner of Real Property from Civil Forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 521 (1991).
103. United States v. Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111 (1993).
104. Id. at 115.
105. Id. at 116.
106. Under the relation-back doctrine, the government would have title to the property from the
time of its criminal use. Thus, any post-illegal use owner, regardless of his or her innocence would
not be able to use the innocent owner defense as title had already vested in the government. See
supra note 17 and 18, and accompanying text discussing the relation back doctrine.
107. Id. at 123.
108. Id. at 127.
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doctrine, the Supreme Court remanded the case to consider whether Brenna's girlfriend
qualified as an innocent owner."
While the Supreme Court offered some guidance for the federal courts to follow
in applying the innocent owner defense, it left untouched one of the most litigated
issues confounding the lower courts. In analyzing the defense, courts are forced to
interpret the meaning of the phrase "without knowledge or consent." A minority of
courts have held that the phrase should be read in the conjunctive, thereby requiring a
claimant to prove both lack of knowledge and lack of consent in order to qualify as an
innocent owner."' For these courts, allowing a disjunctive interpretation would per-
mit an owner with knowledge of the criminal use to be protected under the innocent
owner defense simply by showing a lack of consent. Holding "innocence [is] incom-
patible with knowledge" regardless of consent,"' these courts find such a vast loop-
hole contrary to Congressional intent and require both lack of knowledge and lack of
consent. However, the majority of courts interpret the phrase in the disjunctive."'
Their reasoning is that consent assumes knowledge and in order to give meaning to the
word consent independent of knowledge, the phrase must be interpreted in the disjunc-
tive."3 Further, as Congress did not intend to forfeit property of innocent owners, an
owner must be permitted to establish a lack of consent even though he had
knowledge."4 Thus, a property owner may successfully challenge the forfeiture by
establishing either a lack of knowledge or a lack of consent. For these courts that
adopt the disjunctive interpretation, another problem arises between the treatment of
the pre-illegal act owners and the post-illegal act owners asserting the innocent owner
defense. Although both pre-illegal act owners and post-illegal act owners may establish
the defense by proving either lack of knowledge or consent, the post-illegal act owners
can never give consent to the prior criminal use because the property did not belong
them at the time. Therefore, the disjunctive interpretation appears to create an automat-
ic innocent owner defense for post-illegal act owners who need not be purchasers
under Buena Vista."'
The innocent owner defense faces greater uncertainty given the various defini-
tions attributed to knowledge and consent throughout the circuits. In determining
whether the property owner had knowledge, the issue becomes whether the owner must
simply prove lack of personal knowledge or must meet the higher burden of lack of
objective knowledge, meaning the property owner should have known of the illegal
use. While most courts allow a property owner to merely establish a lack of personal
109. Prior to Buena Vista, the relation-back doctrine trumped the innocent owner defense, thereby
precluding post-illegal act owners from asserting an innocent owner defense.
110. See generally GuRuLE, supra note 1, at 285-93. Post-Buena Vista, the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle, 9 F.3d 74 (9th Cir. 1993), and the Eleventh Circuit in United States
v. 6640 SW 48th Street, 41 F.3d 1448 (11th Cir. 1995), have adopted the conjunctive interpretation.
111. 6640 SW 48th Street, 41 F.3d at 1452.
112. GURULE, supra note 1, at 286. However, most circuits have not addressed the proper interpre-
tation of without "knowledge or consent" Post-Buena Vista.
113. See generally United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994, 1000 (5th
Cir. 1990).
114. See United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990).
115. United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794 (1994) (post-illegal act owner may es-
tablish innocent owner defense by proving lack of consent regardless of his knowledge or willful
blindness). See also GURULE, supra note 1, at 285-86 (As a result of the Buena Vista decision, the
Eleventh Circuit abandoned the conjunctive interpretation in favor of the disjunctive interpretation in
6640 SW 48th Street, 41 F.3d 1448 (11th Cir. 1996)).
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knowledge, these courts prevent an innocent owner defense where the property owner
deliberately or wilfully avoids knowledge of the illegitimate use of the property.'16
The courts reason that "when a person deliberately closes his eyes to the existence of
the facts that would otherwise be obvious or demonstrates a conscious purpose to
avoid enlightenment,"".7 that person should be considered to have knowledge. As to
the meaning given "lack of consent," the courts are divided on whether the claimant
must prove that he did all that he reasonably could to prevent the proscribed use of his
property. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, Co., the Supreme Court in
dicta reasoned that a property owner might have a constitutional defense, distinct from
the innocent owner defense, if he could prove "not only that he was uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also had done all that he reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.""' 9 After Calero-Toledo, the
courts were left to decide whether this dicta should be incorporated into the innocent
owner defense. Some courts refused to require the property owner to prove all reason-
able measures were undertaken in order to establish lack of consent under the innocent
owner defense. 20 For these courts, the property owner will succeed if he or she es-
tablishes lack of consent to the illegal use. Meanwhile, other courts have expressly in-
corporated the Calero-Toledo dicta into the innocent owner defense, thereby requiring
an owner to meet the higher standard in proving lack of consent.'
While the innocent owner defense remains available to property owners, 2 the
burden is upon them to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that they meet
its complex requirements. An owner must first determine if the conjunctive or disjunc-
tive interpretation applies to the phrase "without knowledge or consent." Then, the
owner must determine which definition of "without knowledge" and "lack of consent"
must be proven. Thus, establishing the innocent owner defense is anything but a
straight-forward task for the property owner.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS
Neither proponents nor critics of civil forfeiture deny the need to amend and
reform the current forfeiture laws. However, reaching a compromise whereby the con-
cerns of both sides are adequately addressed remains the challenge before Congress.
On July 22, 1996, the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on H.R. 1916,123 the
116. GURULE, supra note 1, at 293-95.
117. United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 1992) (referring to
the discussion of willful blindness in Mattingly v. United States, 924 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1991), a civil
tax fraud case in which the court considered whether a willful blindness instruction could satisfy a
statutory requirement of knowledge).
118. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
119. Id. at 689.
120. GURULE, supra note 1, at 295-97 (citing United States v. 1 Street A-i, 865 F.2d 427, 430(1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Keeton Heights Subdivision, 869 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1989); One
1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d at 1175 (8th Cir. 1992)).
121. Id. at 295 (citing United States v. 18 & 25 Castle Street, 31 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1994); United
States v. 31 Endless Street, 8 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. 1012 Germantown Road, 963
F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1992)).
122. However, the Supreme Court in Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994, 1001 (1996), held that
nuisance law authorizing forfeiture but not providing an innocent owner defense rendered such defense
unavailable to the innocent spouse. The implication from this decision is that if a civil forfeiture stat-
ute does not provide an innocent owner defense then none is available to the property owner.
123. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1995).
[Vol. 23:93
Civil Forfeiture Reform
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Bill sponsored by Representative Henry Hyde last
year.124 At this hearing, the Department of Justice also presented its own civil forfei-
ture reform proposal. While no action was taken by Congress this term, the hearing is
considered to be a prelude to legislative action that should occur in the early part of
the next session. While each proposal has some merit, there are also areas where re-
form is needed that neither proposal adequately addresses.
A. Department of Justice's Comprehensive Reform Proposal: The
Forfeiture Act of 1996125
The proposed reform presented by the Department of Justice represents a com-
prehensive attempt at improving civil forfeiture law. 26 In the past few years, numer-
ous criticisms have been leveled against the use of civil forfeiture, ranging from im-
proper conduct by the government to inherent flaws in the forfeiture statutes
themselves. In response to academic as well as judicial concern over the future of civil
forfeiture, the Department of Justice undertook the challenge of addressing many of
these flaws and criticisms through proposed legislative reform. In the Forfeiture Act of
1996, the Department of Justice offers resolutions for several of the problems existing
under current law.
Once the government institutes forfeiture proceedings under existing law, the
property owner has only twenty days from the first notice of forfeiture to file a claim
and a cost bond.'27 Under the proposed reform, the claimant would be given thirty
days from the last notice of forfeiture. Further, the property owner may also obtain a
waiver or reduction of the cost bond by showing indigence or substantial hardship. The
Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury have the discretionary power to
waive or reduce the cost bond. 2 ' In order to contest the forfeiture under existing law,
the property owner must pay the cost bond up front or the property will be forfeited.
Furthermore, if the property owner fails to file a claim and pay the cost bond, the De-
partment of Justice's proposal would permit the property owner to appeal the adminis-
trative forfeiture judgment but only on the issue of whether there was adequate notice
as required under the Due Process Clause.'29 This appeal of the administrative forfei-
ture would codify existing case law,"3 while also providing a statute of limitations.
Under the Department of Justice's proposal, the forfeiture of real property would
be judicial as opposed to administrative. 3' Furthermore, claimants would be allowed
124. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform: Hearing on H.R. 1916 before the House Comnm on the Judicia-
ry, 104th Cong. (1996).
125. Forfeiture Act of 1996 Proposal (Hearing on H.R. 1916 before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)) as presented by the Assistant Attorney General on behalf of the Depart-
ment of Justice to the Speaker of the House) (hereinafter DOJ) The proposal by the Department of
Justice was not submitted as a bill, however, the proposal is in bill form. Therefore, citing will be to
the sections as they are found in the Department of Justice's proposal. Copy is available with author.
126. See Stefan D. Cassella, Forfeiture Reform: A View from the Justice Department, 21 J. LEGIS.
211 (1995) for general discussion of the Department of Justice's position on civil forfeiture reform.
127. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994) (applicable to all civil forfeitures under customs laws).
128. DOJ, supra note 125, § 101.
129. Id. § 103 (which would codify leading cases on due process claims). See Toure v. United
States, 24 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Ci. 1993) (If
the owner has actual knowledge, even though the notice was inadequate, there is not a violation of
due process); One 1987 Jeep Wagoneer, 972 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1992).
130. See Linarez v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 213 (7th Cir. 1993).
131. DOJ, supra note 125, § 104.
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to remain in possession of real property even though the government was pursuing its
forfeiture.'32 This proposal seeks to clarify that the government need not remain in
possession of property it is seeking to forfeit. However, if the government remains in
possession of the property throughout the forfeiture proceedings and the property is
ultimately held not to be subject to forfeiture, the property owner would be able to
recover damages for loss of property against the government' under the Federal
Tort Claims Act." Contrary to current law, the government would be liable for dam-
age done to the property while in its possession. Finally, if the government accrued
interest from the property it had seized and that property was later found not to be
subject to forfeiture, then the property owner would have the right to recover the pre-
judgment interest the government received.35 Although courts have been divided on
the right of property owners to interest accrued by the government while seeking the
forfeiture of the property, 36 this proposal would establish that a property owner, suc-
cessful in contesting the forfeiture of his property, has a right to any interest the gov-
ernment obtained from the property.
Procedurally, the Department of Justice also proposes reallocating the burden of
proof in the first instance. Currently, once the government seizes the property and
institutes the forfeiture proceedings, the burden is on the property owner to prove by
the preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture.3 7 The
proposals reallocation would require the government to bear the initial burden of
proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfei-
ture. '3 Only after the government meets this burden would the burden fall upon the
property owner to prove by the preponderance of the evidence any affirmative defense
that would preclude forfeiture, such as the innocent owner defense.'39 In meeting
their respective burdens, neither party may rely on hearsay, while the property owner
may also avail himself of the protections of the Fourth Amendment for suppressing
illegally seized evidence."4 Further, the proposed reform delineates the proper nega-
tive inferences that may be drawn from a claimant's invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. '4 Finally, the Excessive Fines Clause analysis of the Eighth Amendment
132. Id. § 105.
133. Id. § 106.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1994).
135. DOJ, supra note 125, § 107.
136. Compare Library of Congress v. Shaw, 470 U.S. 310, 311 (1986) with United States v.
$277,000, 69 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1995).
137. For a criticism of this approach, see United States v. $30,600, 39 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. $31,990, 982 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1993).
138. DOJ, supra note 125, § 121(e) (This provision would require the government to establish a
substantial connection between the property and the offense when the theory of forfeiture is facilitation,
thus codifying the majority rule as stated in United States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181
(9th Cir. 1995)).
139. The property owner no longer bears the burden of proving that the property is not subject to
forfeiture, however, the owner still has the burden of establishing any affirmative defenses. See United
States v. One Parcel . . . 194 Quaker Farms Rd., 85 F.3d 985 (2d Cir. 1996) (property owner should
retain burden of proving affirmative defenses because the owner is in the best position to establish this
evidence).
140. DOJ, supra note 125, § 121(g) & (h) (Section (g) codifies the criminal exclusionary rule in
the civil context). See United States v. $7,850, 7 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1993).
141. Id. § 121(i) (codifying United States v. Certain Real Property Located At 4003-05 5th Ave.,
55 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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would not be considered until after the entry of the forfeiture judgment.'42 If the
court (as opposed to the jury) finds the forfeiture to be excessive, then the judge may
reduce the amount of the forfeiture. 43 This proposal attempts to guide the federal
courts in the proper procedure to follow in applying the rational of Austin.
If the government seizes the property before trial, the property owner would be
permitted to inform the court that the property is needed to pay attorney's fees. Al-
though not allowed under current law, the court would be required to make a pre-trial
determination of whether probable cause exists to believe the property is subject to
forfeiture.'" This determination is made without regard to any affirmative defenses in
order to prevent a mini-trial from occurring. If the court finds that probable cause
exists, the property would remain subject to forfeiture notwithstanding the defense
costs. If the court concludes that probable cause does not exist, the property would be
released to the claimant.
Probably the most innovative reform suggested by the Department of Justice is
the enactment of the Uniform Innocent Owners Defense 45 which would govern all
civil forfeitures. As it currently stands, some civil forfeiture provisions have an inno-
cent owner defense, while others do not. Further, even these forfeiture provisions
which provide an innocent owner defense vary in scope and application. By establish-
ing an Uniform Innocent Owner Defense, property owners would not be faced with the
uncertainty as to which requirements need to be met, nor would the courts find them-
selves interpreting multiple distinct provisions. Finally, most of the problematic lan-
guage in current provisions is eliminated or clarified.
The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense proposed by the Department of Justice
involves two levels of analysis. The first level applies to property owners at the time
of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture. In order to establish innocence, these prop-
erty owners would be required to prove: (1) either lack of knowledge or (2) that upon
learning of the illegal use to which the property was being used, the property owner
did all that reasonably could be expected to terminate such use, specifically, the owner
did not consent. Furthermore, if a property owner is relying on lack of knowledge as a
defense, the court would be required to reject the defense if the property owner was
willfully blind or ignorant.'" Intentional ignorance would negate the owner's inno-
cence. Thus, as to property owners at the time of the criminal use, the disjunctive, as
opposed to the conjunctive interpretation of the defense, is adopted. The second level
of analysis involves property acquired by the owner after the property's illegal use. The
issue becomes whether the owner knew or should have known about the prior illicit
use. Under the proposal, the property owner would be permitted to establish the de-
fense only if he: (1) is a bonafide purchaser for value, (2) is without knowledge of the
prior illegal use, and (3) is without reasonable cause to know that the property was
subject to forfeiture.'47 The limitation that the property owner be a bona fide purchas-
142. Id. § 121(m).
143. Id. (codifying United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1993)).
144. Id. § 121(1).
145. DOJ, supra note 125, at § 123 (the Innocent Owner Defense Statute to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 983). See also, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2nd Session (1996) (testimony of Stefan Cassella, Deputy Chief Asset
Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section Criminal Division).
146. Id. § 123(b)(1).
147. Id. § 123(b)(2).
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er would preclude family and friends from relying on the defense when the property
was simply given to them as a gift.
However, concern over the potential situation in which property subject to forfei-
ture is jointly owned by a guilty person and an innocent third party, such as a spouse,
led the Department of Justice to provide a court with three options when entering
forfeiture judgments to protect these innocent interests. First, the court may sever the
property if possible, whereby the innocent party retains possession of some of the
property. Second, the court may order the property liquidated, giving the innocent
owner a portion of the proceeds. Finally, the court may permit the innocent spouse or
family to remain in possession of the property.14 However, the property is subject to
a government lien, if the property is disposed of by the owners.
Further, the Uniform Innocent Owner Defense would provide a rebuttable pre-
sumption for financial institutions that hold liens, mortgages or other secured interests
in the property subject to forfeiture.149 If the financial institution proves that it abided
by internal standards created to ensure the exercise of due diligence in making loans
and acquiring interest in the property and was without actual notice of the illegal use
to which the property was being put, there would be a rebuttable presumption that the
financial institution acted "reasonably" for purposes of establishing the innocent owner
defense. The government would be permitted to rebut this presumption by showing
that the financial institution should have been on notice that its internal standards were
inadequate. 0
The Forfeiture Act of 1996 addresses many of the criticisms surrounding existing
forfeiture provisions. It offers owners more protection and clarifies some of the ambi-
guity that previously existed. However, the Department of Justice's proposals fail to
address the issue of attorneys fees for successful property owners or the problem of
returning forfeited property to the seizing agencies. These concerns must be addressed
in order to diminish the incentive and practice of abusing civil forfeiture.
B. Representative Hyde's Bill: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
19955
While Rep. Henry Hyde's proposal is not nearly as comprehensive as the Depart-
ment of Justice's version, it focuses on a few areas of civil forfeiture that are currently
criticized as being unfair: (1) the notice and cost bond requirement, (2) possession of
property by the owner during the forfeiture proceedings, (3) government liability for
damage suffered by property while in the possession of the government, (4) the burden
on the government in judicial forfeiture proceedings, (5) minor reform to the innocent
owner provisions in Title 21, and (6) the right to counsel for indigent property own-
ers.'52 The most provocative and controversial provision within the Rep. Hyde's pro-
posal is the right to counsel for indigent property owners. The other provisions touch
on the general concerns found in the Department of Justice's proposal; however, Rep.
Hyde's proposal tends to be more extreme in redressing the current flaws and abuses of
148. Id. § 123(d).
149. Id. § 123(e).
150. Id.
151. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1995).
152. See also REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROP-
ERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE? (1995).
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civil forfeiture.
As to the procedural reform proposed by Rep. Hyde's proposal, it begins by
reforming the existing notice and cost bond requirement. Once the federal agency or
government has instituted civil forfeiture proceedings, the property owner has a limited
period of time in which to file a claim and cost bond in order to challenge the forfei-
ture. Rep. Hyde's proposal calls for amending the time period from twenty days to
thirty days from the first publication of the notice of forfeiture.'53 The Department of
Justice's proposal allowing for thirty days from the date of the final notice of forfeiture
offers greater protection to property owners than Rep. Hyde's proposal. The cost bond
requirement would be eliminated altogether under Rep. Hyde's proposal.154 Under
existing law, a cost bond must be paid in order for a property owner to challenge
forfeiture. The Department of Justice opposes the elimination of the cost bond, instead,
favoring its in pauperis exception which allows the court to exempt indigent property
owners from the cost bond requirement. Rep. Hyde's concern that a property owner
will not be capable of paying the cost bond would be adequately addressed by the in
pauperis exception, without opening the door for property owners to file meritless
challenges simply because they would no longer have to pay a cost bond.
Rep. Hyde's proposal would return real and personal property to the owner pend-
ing forfeiture judgment upon a showing of substantial hardship."55 While the Depart-
ment of Justice's proposal would also permit the owner of real property to remain in
possession, it opposes the retention of personal property by the owner as such property
is easily diminished or disposed. Under existing law, all property may be seized and
the property owner is not left in possession. Given the Supreme Court's acknowledg-
ment in Calero-Toledo of the need to prevent property owners from frustrating law
enforcement efforts to forfeit personal property,15 the more reasonable approach
would be to adopt the Department of Justice's proposal and only permit retention of
real property.
Rep. Hyde's proposal would also provide for government liability for any injury
suffered by the property while in the hands of the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.5 7 This proposal would not limit recovery to owners who successfully
challenge the forfeiture, namely, innocent owners. 5 ' On the other hand, the De-
partment of Justice's proposal would require that the owner be successful in the chal-
lenge before recovering for any damage done to the property. Given the overly broad
language of Rep. Hyde's proposal, the Department of Justice's proposal limiting the
scope of government liability under the Federal Tort Claim Act appears to protect the
innocent owner while not compensating unsuccessful property owners for damages
suffered by property which now belongs to the government.
Furthermore, Rep. Hyde's proposal would reallocate the burden of proof to the
government while simultaneously calling for a higher standard of proof. First, once the
property owner files a claim and a cost bond, Rep. Hyde's proposal would place the
153. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
154. Id. § 5(a).
155. Id. § 6.
156. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1993), where it
was determined that in limited circumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without an
opportunity for prior hearing, is constitutionally permissible).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1994).
158. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
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initial burden back on the government to prove the property is subject to forfeiture.
Second, it would raise the government's standard of proof to "clear and convinc-
ing." '159 Thus, the government would have to prove that the property was subject to
forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence. The Department of Justice opposes this
high standard, arguing that the preponderance of the evidence standard is normally
used in civil proceedings. As the higher standard would represent an unprecedented
departure from this general standard, the wiser course would be to leave the standard
of proof at the preponderance and secure protections of property owners through other
avenues.
As to the innocent owner defense, Rep. Hyde's proposal would make minor
amendments, most of which would be incorporated into the Uniform Innocent Owner
Defense proposed by the Department of Justice."w Rep. Hyde's proposal would per-
mit a property owner to establish an innocent owner defense simply by proving lack of
consent regardless of knowledge. However, the proposal would define lack of consent
by the higher standard which requires a property owner to take "all reasonable steps to
prevent the illicit use of the property.... The Department of Justice's Uniform Inno-
cent Owner Defense would permit the same defense for property owners at the time of
the illegal use. For those property owners who obtain the property after the criminal
use, the uniform innocent owner statute would require the property owner be a bona
fide purchaser for value without knowledge and without reasonable cause to know the
property is subject to forfeiture. As after-acquired property owners cannot give con-
sent, Rep. Hyde's proposal would create an automatic innocent owner defense. The De-
partment of Justice's proposal addresses the analytical distinction between pre- and
post- illegal act owners. Therefore, the Department of Justice's proposal would be more
practical and avoid the inconsistent results under Rep. Hyde's proposal.
Probably the most controversial aspect of Rep. Hyde's proposal is the provision
for the appointment of counsel for indigent property owners. 62 In the context of civil
proceedings, the appointment of counsel is unprecedented. As there is no threat to
personal liberty, the right to counsel has never been applied in the civil context."3
Under Rep. Hyde's proposal, the court appointed counsel would be paid for out of the
Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund, regardless of the success or failure on the merits of the
forfeiture challenge. An ironic result would occur if the government were required to
pay for attorneys fees of an unsuccessful owner. Given the uncertainty of establishing
this right, the prudent course of action is to analyze other alternatives. While the Hyde
proposal correctly points out the need to address the costs a property owner incurs in
contesting civil forfeiture, its solution is extreme and may be unnecessary if other
159. Id. § 4.
160. H.R. 1916 only amends the innocent owner defense in Title 21 with regard to drug forfei-
tures.
161. Id. § 8; DOJ, supra note 125, § 123(b)(1)(B).
162. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995).
163. See United States v. $292,888.04 in United States Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995)
(as civil forfeiture did not carry potential for imprisonment, Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not
attach); United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996) (generally no constitutional right
to counsel in civil actions, therefore, no right to effective counsel in civil forfeiture actions); United
States v. $100,375.00 in United States Currency, 70 F.3d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel did not apply in civil forfeiture proceedings); United States v. 7108 West
Grand Avenue, 15 F.3d 632 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2691 (1994) (finding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel did not apply in civil forfeiture proceedings).
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alternatives would achieve the same result.
The Department of Justice's proposal and Rep. Hyde's proposal awaiting Con-
gress in the 1997 session offer unprecedented efforts of civil asset forfeiture reform.
They provide Congress with critical guidance in this complex area of law. However,
further legislative reform beyond that proposed by either the Department of Justice or
Rep. Hyde's Proposal is necessary. In addition, internal guidelines and regulations
among the seizing offices and prosecuting governments must be strictly enforced if the
legitimacy of civil forfeiture is going to be maintained.
VII. REFORM BEYOND THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
A. Attorneys Fees
While Rep. Hyde's proposal for appointing counsel for indigent property owners
is too extreme a solution to the problem of the enormous legal costs involved in con-
testing civil forfeiture, it properly points to an area where reform is needed, especially
for those property owners who are successful in contesting the forfeiture. For owners
whose property value is less than the cost of hiring an attorney to challenge the for-
feiture, it makes little economic sense to contest the forfeiture. Even if the property
owner is successful and the property is returned, the owner loses all of the money
spent on attorneys fees which may far exceed the value of the property. This situation
is unacceptable as the innocent property owner either permits the forfeiture of the
property or contests the forfeiture, thereby incurring legal costs in excess of the value
of the property. Thus, civil forfeiture reform must incorporate some type of an award-
ing of attorneys fees for those property owners who are successful in challenging the
forfeiture. An innocent property owner would not only regain the property but also be
reimbursed for legal costs so the innocent owner would be made whole. Any amount
of reimbursement should come out of the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund.
Currently under the Equal Access to Justice Act,I' a court "shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses" in a civil action
brought by the United States unless it finds that the government's action was substan-
tially justified or special circumstances existed that would render an award unjust. 5
In United States v. Douglas," the Eleventh Circuit held that civil forfeiture proceed-
ings are "civil action" within the meaning of this Act. The civil forfeiture in this case
was ancillary to criminal forfeiture prosecutions. The defendant entered into a plea
agreement in which he consented to the forfeiture of his property. Prior to this plea
agreement, however, Noel Lussier loaned the defendant $157,500.00 and instituted a
civil action to recover the sum from defendant's properties. The Lussier court deposited
defendant's property with the clerk pending resolution of the litigation. The property
forfeited as part of the plea agreement included some of the property involved in
Lussier's lawsuit."7 The Douglas court held that property owners and third party
claimants could sue the government to recover legal expenses incurred as a result of an
unsubstantiated civil forfeiture proceeding. It declared that "[f]ailure to apply the Equal
Access to Justice Act to [forfeiture under § 853(n)] would contravene Congress's desire
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994).
165. Id.
166. 55 F.3d 584 (1lth Cir. 1995).
167. Id.
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to instill governmental accountability and to level the playing field in economic dis-
putes between the government and its citizens." '168 The court held that the substantial
basis requirement was met if there was a reasonable basis in law and fact to support
the government's claim. 9 As the government was aware of Lussier's lawsuit render-
ing the property not subject to forfeiture, the court found the government's forfeiture
frivolous and affirmed the awarding of attorneys fees."70
While the Equal Access to Justice Act provides a legal basis for awarding attor-
neys fees to property owners, there is concern that the property owner will not be
made whole, even if successful in challenging the forfeiture, unless the government
lacked a substantial basis. It.might be more appropriate to require a higher showing
than a reasonable basis in law and fact in order to establish the government's action
had a substantial basis. Or it might be more preferable to reimburse all successful
property owners for legal fees incurred as a result of contesting the forfeiture proceed-
ing by providing for a lose-pay provision in the civil forfeiture statutes.
One additional aspect supporting the awarding of attorneys fees for successful
property owners is the deterrent affect it would have on abusive or meritless seizures
and forfeiture proceedings. The seizing agencies and the prosecuting offices would
have to consider the strength of their evidence establishing that the property is subject
to forfeiture and decide whether to pursue judicial forfeitures. The forfeiture would not
be pursued in weak cases for fear of having to reimburse property owners for their
attorney's costs. Therefore, the abuse of civil forfeiture by law enforcement would also
be curtailed as a result.
B. Redistribution to Law Enforcement Agencies
One area of civil forfeiture not addressed in either of the proposed reforms is the
redistribution of the forfeited property back to law enforcement, more specifically,
back to the seizing agency.' Under current law, this redistribution creates greater
incentive for these agencies to seize suspect property. Furthermore, as forfeiture
amounts have been included in fiscal budgets, the need to seize property is no longer
an option, rather, it is a necessity. As the power to seize leads to direct benefits, this
power is being abused in some instances. Preventing this overly eager and abusive
seizing of property by law enforcement does not require the elimination of civil forfei-
ture. Instead, it requires the elimination of the incentive or motive to abuse.
Clearly, forfeitures of illegally used or derived property attacks the economic
base of the criminal enterprises. However, the derived property need not be entirely
returned to the seizing agency. Instead, some of the property should be redistributed
into educational and social programs, such as D.A.R.E, aimed at the prevention of
crime. 72 Thus, a BMW seized by the Drug Enforcement Agency should be sold and
168. Id. at 587.
169. Id. at 588. But see United States v. Real Property Located At 2323 Charms Rd., 946 F.2d
437 (6th Cir. 1991) (substantial basis met if government complied with particularity requirement of
Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule (E)(2)(a)).
170. Id. at 589.
171. See generally, Cheh, supra note 59, at 41-47 (discussing problems surrounding direct pay-back
to law enforcement of forfeited assets); Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture v. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 95, 107-12 (1994); LEVY, supra note 2, at 144-60.
172. Cassella Testimony, supra note 145 (seizing agency authorized to give up to 15% of the
redistributed funds to community programs).
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the proceeds should be directed towards an inner-city youth program or adult rehabili-
tation programs. The seizing agency should still be given some portion of the property
seized to allay its law enforcement costs, but the majority of the property or the pro-
ceeds should be directed at preventative programs. In order to allow these agencies to
readjust their fiscal budgets to compensate for the lost forfeiture proceeds, the redis-
tribution should be implemented over a period of years. Thus, reducing the portion of
the forfeited property returned to the seizing office will diminish the incentive to abuse
civil forfeiture.
C. Internal Guidelines and Procedures
[K]eep in mind, however, that the purpose of civil forfeiture is to deter and punish
criminal activity, not to make a profit for the government or collect property for
official use."
Legislative reform is insufficient to eliminate some of the abuses that occur
internally within the agencies. Within the seizing agencies (state and federal), Depart-
ment of Justice, and state prosecuting offices, strict internal guidelines need to be
adhered to or implemented in order to curb overzealous civil forfeiture. Guidelines
should delineate: (1) the appropriate circumstances for seizing property, (2) when an
administrative forfeiture should be pursued, and (3) upon a property owner's challenge,
when the prosecuting office should maintain a judicial forfeiture proceeding." Fur-
ther, when these guidelines are not followed or when their standards are not met, for-
feiture proceedings should be dismissed and the property returned to its owner. Deals
whereby the property owner forfeits part of the property simply to settle when in actu-
ality none of the property is forfeitable should not occur. The financial costs of con-
testing forfeiture should not be used as leverage by the seizing office to convince
owners to submit to forfeiture. The seizing agency must not maintain forfeiture pro-
ceedings that are not legitimate, such as the seizure of property where the property is
not subject to forfeiture. Internal guidelines must be implemented and adhered to in
order to promote civil forfeiture while preventing its abuse.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress faces a heavy burden in its 1997 session. Civil forfeiture reform mea-
sures must be undertaken to address the current flaws and abuses which permit the
improper use of civil forfeiture. However, Congress must be leery of reform which
renders civil forfeiture ineffective as a tool in the government's "war on drugs." There-
fore, it is critical that Congress not act hastily or take extreme actions after considering
Rep. Hyde's proposal and the proposal submitted by the Department of Justice. Drastic
measures should not be adopted when less extreme measures aimed at comprehensive
reform will provide effective reform while preventing undesirable consequences. Fur-
thermore, law enforcement agencies must adhere to internal civil forfeiture regulations.
If they do not attempt to curb internal abuses, they only force Congress and the courts
to do it for them by narrowing the use of civil forfeitures in the war on drugs.
173. TROLAND, ASSET FoRFEIURE: LAW, PRACrICE, AND POLIcY 55 (1988).
174. See TROLAND, supra note 173 (discussing federal asset forfeiture procedures and guidelines);
see also, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DRUG AGENT'S GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS
(1987).
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